The Missed Opportunity of a No-Fly Zone and Ground Protection Strategy
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a watershed moment in modern European history. It tested the West’s commitment to international law, human rights, and the principle of collective security. As the war dragged on and images of bombed-out apartment buildings, destroyed hospitals, and mass civilian displacement circulated around the world, many began to ask: Could the West have done more to protect Ukrainian civilians? One of the most glaring omissions in the Western response was the failure to establish a no-fly zone over Ukrainian territory not occupied by Russian forces. Coupled with this was the absence of any international effort to place independent troops on the ground to safeguard critical infrastructure and protect civilians. This article explores the rationale, feasibility, and consequences of these failures, examining whether the West missed a crucial opportunity to alter the course of the war.
The Strategic Case for a No-Fly Zone
From the early days of the invasion, Russia leveraged its air superiority to strike deep into Ukrainian territory. Civilian infrastructure, hospitals, power stations, residential blocks, and schools, became routine targets. A no-fly zone, implemented over non-occupied Ukrainian territory, could have significantly limited Russia’s ability to carry out these strikes.
Critics of the no-fly zone argued that it would escalate the war and risk direct confrontation between NATO and Russia. This fear paralyzed serious discussions about its feasibility. However, the cost of inaction has been astronomical: tens of thousands of civilian casualties, millions of refugees, and widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure. A carefully enforced no-fly zone over western and central Ukraine could have created safe zones for civilians, humanitarian corridors, and operational bases for international aid organizations.
Missed Timing: Crimea in 2014
The first critical opportunity to prevent escalation came in 2014 with Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The West responded with economic sanctions and diplomatic condemnation, but no tangible security guarantees for Ukraine. This emboldened Russia. A no-fly zone over Ukraine’s mainland (excluding Crimea and separatist-controlled Donbas) at that time would have signalled a firm line.
Such a zone, backed by a UN Security Council resolution (or, absent that, a coalition of willing nations), would have served two purposes. First, it would have deterred further Russian military aggression. Second, it would have offered Ukrainian civilians protection from future incursions. The argument that a no-fly zone would have meant war ignores the fact that Russia was already at war with Ukraine. The West’s reluctance to accept that reality only fuelled further Russian adventurism.
February 2022: The Last Window
The second, more urgent opportunity arose in February 2022. As Russian troops poured over the border, the world watched in horror. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy pleaded with the international community to impose a no-fly zone. The requests were dismissed almost immediately by NATO officials, citing the risk of triggering World War III.
Yet this framing ignored a key point: a no-fly zone does not have to cover the entire country. A limited, clearly demarcated zone, focused on the west and centre, far from Russian front lines—could have been established with lower risk. This could have provided a lifeline to civilians fleeing the war, protected key humanitarian hubs, and preserved critical infrastructure like energy grids and medical facilities.
The Role of Independent Boots on the Ground
The establishment of a no-fly zone, while significant, would not have been sufficient on its own. It needed to be complemented by the presence of international, non-combatant troops tasked with protecting infrastructure and ensuring humanitarian access. These troops would not have been involved in combat with Russian forces but instead served as a stabilising, deterrent presence.
Much like UN peacekeeping missions in other parts of the world, these international troops could have been deployed to key facilities, nuclear power plants, hospitals, water treatment centres, and refugee corridors. Their presence alone might have dissuaded Russian forces from targeting these areas, knowing it could provoke a broader international incident.
Legal and Political Justifications
Legally, the deployment of a no-fly zone and independent protection forces could have been justified under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, adopted by all UN member states in 2005. R2P obliges the international community to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity when the state in question is unwilling or unable to do so.
Ukraine, clearly unable to prevent widespread civilian suffering from an external aggressor, met this criterion. The refusal of the UN Security Council to act decisively due to Russian veto power highlights the structural weaknesses in global governance. Nevertheless, a coalition of states could have acted unilaterally or through regional alliances to fulfil the spirit of R2P.
Politically, Western nations repeatedly voiced their support for Ukrainian sovereignty and the sanctity of international law. Yet when it came to concrete action, they hesitated. This gap between rhetoric and action eroded trust in the West’s commitment to human rights and democratic values.
Military Feasibility and Risk Management
Critics argue that a no-fly zone would have necessitated the shooting down of Russian aircraft, sparking direct NATO-Russia conflict. However, risk mitigation strategies were available. For example, the airspace could have been patrolled primarily by non-NATO forces or countries without direct military entanglements with Russia.
Advanced air defence systems could have been deployed along Ukraine’s western border, with clear protocols limiting engagement to aircraft violating the zone. A rules-based approach, backed by real-time intelligence and communication with Russian counterparts, could have lowered the likelihood of escalation.
Moreover, NATO and Western militaries are among the most advanced in the world. The idea that Russia would willingly engage in a war with the full might of NATO was likely more deterrent than escalatory.
The Consequences of Inaction
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, civilian populations far from active front lines have suffered significant casualties due to missile strikes, artillery shelling, and aerial bombardments. These attacks have targeted residential areas, public spaces, and critical infrastructure, leading to substantial loss of life and injury.
Overall Civilian Casualties
As of April 2025, the United Nations has reported approximately 13,000 civilian deaths in Ukraine, including 682 children, with an additional 30,700 individuals injured. These figures are considered conservative, with actual numbers likely higher due to unverified reports and areas inaccessible for assessment. DIE WELT
Notable Incidents Away from Front Lines
Several significant attacks have occurred in areas distant from active combat zones:
- Mariupol Theatre Strike (March 16, 2022): A Russian airstrike targeted a theatre in Mariupol sheltering civilians, resulting in approximately 600 deaths. AP News
- Kramatorsk Train Station Attack (April 8, 2022): A missile strike on the Kramatorsk train station, crowded with evacuees, killed 61 people and injured 135. AP News
- Dnipro Apartment Building Strike (January 14, 2023): A missile hit a residential building in Dnipro, causing at least 40 deaths, including three children, and injuring 75 others. AP News
- Uman Missile Attack (April 28, 2023): Cruise missiles struck an apartment block in Uman, killing 21 people, including three children. AP News
- Lviv Residential Strike (July 2023): A missile attack on an apartment building in Lviv resulted in the deaths of seven civilians, including a mother and her three daughters. The Times
- Poltava Missile Attack (September 2024): Missiles hit the Poltava Military Institute and a neighbouring hospital, killing at least 51 people and injuring over 200. The Times
Impact on Civilian Infrastructure
Beyond immediate casualties, these attacks have severely damaged essential infrastructure, including hospitals, power stations, and residential buildings, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and displacing millions. The United Nations estimates that over 40% of Ukrainians require humanitarian assistance due to the destruction of critical infrastructure. AP News
These incidents underscore the profound impact of the conflict on civilians, even in areas removed from active combat, highlighting the urgent need for enhanced protective measures and international support.
The humanitarian cost of the West’s inaction is staggering. Over 10 million Ukrainians have been displaced. Thousands of civilians have died in airstrikes on residential areas, hospitals, and public infrastructure. Entire cities, like Mariupol and Bakhmut, have been raised to the ground.
Furthermore, the psychological toll on the Ukrainian population is immeasurable. The lack of safe zones forced families to live under constant threat. Children grew up to the sound of air raid sirens and the sight of destruction. The social and economic fabric of the country has been torn apart.
From a geopolitical standpoint, the war has weakened the post Cold War security architecture. Russia has tested and exposed the limits of Western resolve. Other authoritarian regimes are watching, drawing conclusions about the viability of aggression in the face of Western passivity.
What Could Still Be Done
Though the initial windows of opportunity have closed, there are still steps the West can take. First, it can establish and enforce humanitarian air corridors for aid delivery. Second, it can provide Ukraine with more advanced air defence systems to create a de facto no-fly zone. Third, it can push for an international observer mission, with a limited mandate to protect key infrastructure.
Lastly, the West must reassess its frameworks for intervention. The idea that action must be unanimous or risk-free is unrealistic in a multipolar world. Future responses should prioritise civilian protection over geopolitical caution.
Conclusion
The West’s failure to establish a no-fly zone and deploy protective ground forces in Ukraine will be remembered as a historic missed opportunity. The fear of escalation overrode the moral imperative to protect civilians and uphold international norms. While sanctions, weapons, and financial aid have been crucial, they were reactive measures. A proactive, protective strategy, beginning in 2014 or at the latest in 2022, could have saved thousands of lives and preserved Ukraine’s infrastructure.
History will judge the West not just by what it did to help Ukraine, but by what it failed to do when the moment demanded bold, principled action.