The Hijacking of a Crisis – How the Climate Debate Lost Its Way

“Humanity is a drunk driver who thinks by driving faster he will save the lamp posts by not crashing into them – ignoring the fact he should not be in the car in the first place.”

The start of Recognition

The modern environmental movement, now saturated with slogans and net-zero targets, began with something much simpler: observation. In the 1850s, Irish physicist John Tyndall identified the role of carbon dioxide and water vapour in trapping heat in the atmosphere. By the late 19th century, Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius had begun calculating the potential warming effect of increasing CO₂ levels due to coal burning. Even then, there was a warning beneath the curiosity: that human industrial activity could, given enough time, alter the balance of the planet’s atmosphere.

Svante Arrhenius conducted his pioneering research in 1896 that linked atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO₂) concentrations to global warming. His calculations suggested that a doubling of CO₂ levels could increase Earth’s average temperature by approximately 5° to 6° Celsius. This foundational concept of climate science is now referred to as the greenhouse effect, where gases like CO₂ trap infrared radiation, leading to increased surface temperatures (Upadhyay & Sachdeva, 2012) (Hindiyeh et al., 2021) (Hasselmann, 1999).

Arrhenius arrived at his conclusions through a combination of observational data and theoretical models. He utilized measurements of solar radiation, atmospheric CO₂ concentrations, and historical climate conditions to create what is now known as the Arrhenius equation, which quantitatively links temperature effects to changes in gas concentration (Upadhyay & Sachdeva, 2012; (Lapenis, 1998). His methodology was innovative for the time, involving the approximation of the balance between solar energy income and the energy reradiated by Earth, adjusted for the greenhouse effect attributable to atmospheric gases (MacCracken, 2006; Hasselmann, 1999).

Despite the scientific significance of Arrhenius’s work, his experiments were not replicated with more advanced techniques due to a variety of factors. First, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the instruments available were not sufficiently precise for accurate measurements of atmospheric gases and their effects on climate (MacCracken, 2006) (Franzen & Franzen, 2024). Additionally, early interest in greenhouse gas science waned until the mid-20th century, as the consequences of industrial pollution and rising CO₂ levels were not widely recognised or understood (Mitchell, 2022).

Furthermore, subsequent research primarily focused on observational studies rather than replicating Arrhenius’s early laboratory conditions, leading to a lack of direct tests of his initial calculations (Hindiyeh et al., 2021).

In the latter half of the 20th century, the focus shifted toward more complex climate modelling that incorporated Arrhenius’s theories but did not strictly replicate his early experimental setups (Lapenis, 1998) (Hori et al., 2002). Furthermore, the rise of sophisticated computational models allowed scientists to simulate the effects of varying CO₂ levels without the need to directly reproduce early experiments. This transition contributed to a general consensus among scientists regarding the role of human activities in climate change, rooted in Arrhenius’s foundational insights (Franzen & Franzen, 2024) (Mitchell, 2022).

Svante Arrhenius laid the groundwork for our understanding of climate science in 1896 through meticulous calculations linking CO₂ levels to temperature changes. His work, although originally conducted with limited experimental methods, helped catalyse further developments in climate modelling, despite the lack of direct replication of his initial experiments with more calibrated instruments (Lapenis, 1998) (Mitchell, 2022).

This was not hysteria, it was not politicised, but it was pure science.

An Early Warning and Real Action

Throughout the 20th century, warnings mounted. In the 1950s, Charles Keeling began measuring atmospheric CO₂ at Mauna Loa, Hawaii, giving rise to what is now known as the Keeling Curve. The steady upward trend became irrefutable evidence of atmospheric change. Yet still, policy lagged. Scientists warned. Governments ignored. Industrial growth marched on.

The introduction of the Clean Air Act in the United Kingdom in 1956 was fundamentally a response to the severe public health crisis precipitated by significant air pollution events, particularly the London Smog of December 1952. This incident resulted in widespread morbidity and mortality, with estimates reaching around 12,000 excess deaths attributed to respiratory diseases and other health complications caused by the dense fog laden with pollutants from coal combustion and other industrial activities (Phillips et al., 2018), Lowry et al., 2016). Such catastrophic health outcomes galvanized public opinion and created a pressing political impetus for regulatory action aimed at mitigating air pollution.

The 1952 event was marked not only by tragic health implications but also by significant social disruption, as it vividly highlighted the relationship between urban industrial practices and deteriorating air quality. Prior to the Clean Air Act, numerous legislative efforts, such as the Public Health Acts of 1875 and 1926, had attempted to address pollution but with limited effectiveness (Carnell et al., 2019). It was the experience of the Great Smog, however, that catalysed broader public awareness and concern regarding air quality, ultimately compelling the legislature to act decisively (Longhurst et al., 2016).

The Clean Air Act of 1956 aimed to tackle the issues of smoke and sulphur dioxide emissions, largely from the widespread use of coal as a domestic and industrial fuel (Phillips et al., 2018). Key provisions under this legislation established “smokeless zones,” particularly in urban areas like London, where the burning of coal was restricted (Geels et al., 2017). This shift not only facilitated cleaner air but also led to an overall transformation in energy consumption patterns, effectively hastening the transition towards smokeless fuels and gas, which yielded substantial improvements in air quality over subsequent decades (Longhurst et al., 2016).

In monitoring the effectiveness of the Clean Air Act, later studies demonstrated marked improvements in visibility and reductions in particulate pollution in the UK, affirming the law’s success in achieving its primary environmental goals (Singh et al., 2017). Additionally, a systematic review of air quality management practices post 1956 revealed that public health gains could be largely attributed to the proactive measures born from the catastrophic events leading to the Act’s passage (Longhurst et al., 2016). Notably, the national survey of smoke and sulphur dioxide concentrations that began in the 1960s reflected the ongoing commitment to understanding and managing air pollution in the UK (Phillips et al., 2018).

The Clean Air Act was a significant legislative landmark born out of a dire public health crisis. It sought to curb the pollution levels resulting from coal usage and has since been pivotal in shaping air quality management in the UK, showcasing a vital relationship between health crises, public policy, and environmental quality. The UK Clean Air Act was also used as a template in other countries, who tailored their legislation to match their particular circumstances.

The Petrochemical Lies

However, what no-one saw, at that time, and the Clean Air Act was unable to address, was the looming threat posed by the burning of fossil fuels in internal combustion engines and aircraft engines, despite the knowledge in the Petrochemical industry, and how sales of both road vehicles and the commercial aviation industry was set to expand, almost, exponentially in the coming decades.

Crucially, we must note, by the late 1950s and early 1960s, oil and gas companies were already aware of the potential consequences of continued fossil fuel combustion. Internal research by companies such as Exxon (then Esso/ExxonMobil) indicated that burning their products could lead to substantial increases in atmospheric CO₂ and consequential planetary warming.

In fact, a 1959 symposium at Columbia University, sponsored by the American Petroleum Institute and attended by industry leaders, featured prominent scientists warning about the dangers of fossil fuel emissions on global climate.

The symposium took place under the auspices of the Business Council for Sustainable Energy at Columbia University and involved distinguished scientists, including climatologists, atmospheric chemists, and geophysicists. Prominent figures included Dr. Edward Teller, Dr. Roger Revelle, and Dr. Charles David Keeling, who had conducted pivotal research that would later form the basis of climate science as known today.

The presentations highlighted several key points:

• Fossil Fuel Emissions and Carbon Dioxide Levels: Scientists presented findings that demonstrated an alarming correlation between the combustion of fossil fuels, the increase of carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere, and potential climatic impacts—foreshadowing what would later be termed anthropogenic climate change.
• Global Temperature Increases: Evidence was introduced suggesting that rising carbon dioxide levels could lead to global temperature increases, with potential repercussions for weather patterns and sea-level rise. This was among the first clear articulations of the potential for human-induced climate change resulting from fossil fuel use.
• The Need for Research: Scientists called for increased research into the implications of fossil fuel combustion on climate and the environment, advocating for a deeper understanding of the long-term effects of greenhouse gas emissions.

Despite the compelling scientific evidence presented, the symposium also revealed a complex dynamic between scientific findings and industrial interests. Many industry leaders acknowledged the research but were cautious in their acceptance of the implications, reflecting a tension between economic growth and environmental stewardship. The API’s involvement illustrated the industry’s attempt to engage with scientific discourse while simultaneously advocating for ongoing fossil fuel development.

The 1959 symposium stands as a critical reference point in the narrative of climate discourse and fossil fuels. It foreshadowed the broader climate debates that would emerge in subsequent decades, including the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 and the eventual signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.

The warning voices of the scientists at the symposium bear resemblance to later scientific bodies that have unequivocally linked fossil fuel emissions to global warming and climate change.

Internal research by scientists employed in the petrochemical industry, especially Exxon, highlighted the problem of burning fossil fuels and the impact these would have on the environment. The impact was not only the potential for climate change due to the warming effects of CO2, but also the human health and ecological damage caused by the pollution created by burning fossil fuel. The industry chose to keep this information from the public record and in fact, the industry began to downplay the results of its own research.

Research into the impact of the research that was conducted during this time within the petrochemical industry, during the 1950s to the 1970s, strongly suggests that there was a conscious effort to downplay the environmental consequences of fossil fuel combustion, particularly its contribution to climate change.

Multiple studies corroborate this assertion, revealing a history of the petrochemical industry engaging in deliberate and contrived disinformation campaigns despite their own internal evidence linking fossil fuel use with increasing carbon dioxide (CO2) levels, potential climate warming as well as the poisoning of human and ecological health.

Initial research indicates that key players in the fossil fuel industry were aware of the link between CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel combustion and climate change well before global awareness peaked. Heede discusses the responsibility of fossil fuel producers, pointing out that these entities have critical profit motives that influence their production decisions, contributing significantly to future emissions and climate impacts as outlined by the International Energy Agency (Heede, 2013). This reference adequately supports the claim regarding the links between fossil fuel production, emissions, and the climate system.

The combustion of fossil fuels is recognised as a major driver of climate change, with reports indicating that CO₂ emissions from energy consumption were projected to increase substantially, thereby fuelling global warming and associated climate phenomena (Ansaripour et al., 2017). This reference aligns with the assertion about the impact of fossil fuels on climate change.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has long noted the substantial impact of CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel combustion. The emissions from vehicles, power plants, and industrial activities are attributed to atmospheric CO₂, which can persist for centuries (withdraw, 2024). This reference is consistent with the claim about the long-lived nature of CO₂ as a greenhouse gas.

Furthermore, Beck’s work illustrates the strategic use of misinformation by the fossil fuel industry over decades, detailing how campaigns have systematically cast doubt on scientific consensus surrounding climate change and its anthropogenic causes (Beck, 2023). This reference supports the statement regarding tactics employed by the fossil fuel industry to sow doubt about climate change.

The historical narrative reveals that while there was a growing body of scientific evidence correlating fossil fuel combustion with climate change, many fossil fuel companies engaged in practices aimed at downplaying these consequences, thus contributing to a political and social atmosphere resistant to addressing climate change (McCright & Dunlap, 2011). This reference provides relevant information about societal denial and inaction facilitated by the fossil fuel industry.

There is substantial academic evidence supporting the claim that the petrochemical industry was aware of the detrimental effects of fossil fuel combustion on climate change from the mid-20th century onward and that they took deliberate steps to distort this information to protect their profits and continue business operations.

Despite this knowledge, these findings were not shared with the public. On the contrary, the industry engaged in deliberate efforts to discredit climate science, fund misinformation campaigns, and lobby against regulatory measures that would reduce carbon emissions. This was not ignorance. It was calculated deception.

Government Failure, Corruption and Complicity

Governments, too, were complicit in their indifference. During the 1970s and 1980s, numerous national and international reports warned of the environmental consequences of unchecked industrial pollution, deforestation, and fossil fuel consumption. Yet most of these warnings were shelved, their recommendations either ignored or watered down under pressure from industry lobbyists or political expediency. The Brundtland Report (1987), while pivotal in coining the term “sustainable development”, still fell short of confronting the entrenched industrial systems driving the crisis.

Governments made noises about action, but in reality, they were in the pocket of the petrochemical industry and other interested parties who had a vested interest in the status quo. Failure to curtail and regulate the Petrochemical industry is evidence of this. The Lobbyists and the campaign donations to political players, bodies and parties ensured the industry was left alone.

This may be a cynical view, but facts are facts and cannot be denied.

The creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 should have marked a turning point. Instead, its early reports were repeatedly softened under political pressure. Its Summary for Policymakers documents were often altered by national governments before release, introducing ambiguity or false balance. While many of the IPCC’s scientists are diligent and sincere, the institutional process has often prioritised consensus over accuracy, simplicity over complexity, and caution over candour.

By the 1990s, public discourse finally began to acknowledge global warming, and by the 2000s, the term “climate change” had entered mainstream political parlance. But with awareness came distortion. What began as a genuine concern for the stability of Earth’s life-support systems was gradually transformed into a politicised, monetised, and deeply fragmented narrative.

The Climate Conversation was Hijacked.

What should have been a plenary moment of scientific humility and global cooperation was instead carved up into political battlegrounds, bureaucratic targets, and financial opportunities. Carbon credits. Green bonds. Net-zero pledges with timelines that outlive the careers of those making them. A new language emerged, one that sounded technical but meant little: sustainability, offsetting, neutrality. Behind this jargon, the real work of ecological restoration has been dramatically neglected.

Companies rebranded. Governments postured. Economies invented entire sectors around appearing to care. Yet our air remains toxic, our rivers polluted, and our forests continue to fall. And yet, the carbon continues to rise.

The debate surrounding net zero commitments, greenwashing, carbon offsets, and carbon credits reveals a complex interplay between environmental intentions and the realities of political and economic frameworks. Numerous studies have scrutinised the efficacy and practical impact of these measures, suggesting they may amplify rather than alleviate the problem of carbon emissions.

A noteworthy critique of carbon offsetting mechanisms under initiatives like the Paris Agreement indicates that such systems often serve as tools for businesses to claim compliance without making substantial changes to their operations (Lo, 2023). While carbon credits are designed to encourage investment in renewable energy projects, the actual reduction in emissions achieved through these investments remains highly contentious.

Evidence suggests that many of the credits are based on projects that would have been financially viable even without the incentive, leading to a scenario referred to as “additionality” failure, where the measures implemented do not contribute to net reductions in global carbon emissions. This phenomenon may empower polluters to continue their harmful practices under the guise of corporate responsibility (Fankhauser & Hepburn, 2010).

Moreover, the structure of green credit policies within various national contexts, such as in China, reveals significant regional disparities in effectiveness. Research indicates that green credits have differentiated impacts based largely on local economic conditions and the pre-existing pollution profile of regions (Bao & He, 2022) (Liu, 2023). This raises questions about their uniform utility as tools for emissions reductions: while they may function well in economically developed areas, they appear less effective in regions with weaker financial structures or those heavily reliant on polluting industries (Zheng & Men, 2025) (Qin & Cao, 2022).

The potential for greenwashing in these financial instruments cannot be ignored, as corporations may significantly benefit from appearing environmentally responsible without enforcing meaningful changes in their pollution practices (Gai & Wang, 2024). Some studies argue that policies, especially those based on market mechanisms like emissions trading systems, are often manipulated to prioritise economic interests over genuine environmental outcomes (Chang, 2015).

This manipulation is compounded by political dynamics, such as lobbying from industries that stand to lose economically from stricter environmental regulations (Chang, 2015). The complex interplay of economic viability and environmental responsibility often sees carbon trading systems generating profits while failing to achieve substantial reductions in emissions, leading to accusations of a “green facade” (Liu et al., 2023).

In evaluating the surface-level efficacy of carbon offsetting schemes, there is compelling evidence that they may serve more as political tokens than as genuine solutions to global pollution challenges. While the intention behind these mechanisms is to redirect investment towards greener technologies, the disconnect between policy objectives and the actual environmental benefits realized on the ground suggests they are often co-opted to maintain the status quo of high-emission practices (Li et al., 2022) (Zhang et al., 2021).

Existing research calls for a more transparent assessment of these systems to hold corporations accountable and to realign environmental policies with their intended outcomes of reducing global emissions and fostering sustainable economic practices (Zhang et al., 2021) (Liu & Guo, 2024).

So, while initiatives such as carbon credits and green credit policies are structured to facilitate emissions reductions and promote sustainable practices, the empirical evidence often highlights their limitations. Rather than representing substantive progress towards healthy environmental practices, they frequently act as mechanisms for political leverage, allowing continued emissions under the guise of compliance and responsibility. Therefore, a revaluation of these frameworks, focusing on transparency and efficacy, is crucial in fostering genuine environmental reform.

The Public – Outraged, but Fooled

The public, rightly concerned, were given a narrative that was both over-simplified and emotionally manipulative. Temperature thresholds became the obsession. 1.5°C. 2.0°C. These numbers, while rooted in modelling scenarios, were presented as fixed boundaries between safety and catastrophe. But they are not switches. They are symbolic thresholds that obscure the deeper systemic damage already done.

Worse still, much of the scientific discussion was overtaken by political ideology. To question the accuracy of models, or to point out flaws in emissions tracking, or to suggest that pollution and ecosystem degradation mattered more than CO₂ alone, was to risk being labelled a denier. Thus, dissenting scientists and systems thinkers were pushed aside in favour of consensus based repetition of the same narrative: lower emissions, fix the climate.

But the climate is not a tap to be turned on or off. It is the emergent product of countless interdependent systems: the global ocean, soils, forests, clouds, polar ice, tectonic and volcanic activity, and atmospheric chemistry. Our failure to understand and respect that complexity is at the heart of the crisis. We treat each system as a standalone mildly interacting with its neighbour, but we could not be more wrong.

And into this failure has stepped the opportunists. Carbon offsetting became a £billions a year industry, built on the fantasy that planting trees or buying credits can somehow erase the consequences of burning fossil fuels, producing industrial waste, or clearing ecosystems. Greenwashing became the currency of the age. Polluters bought indulgences and carried on. Governments reported progress while emissions rose. NGOs traded in influence.

Were the Public Pacified?

Major fossil fuel firms exploited these delays and diluted messages to cast doubt. Internal memos from ExxonMobil in the 1990s explicitly noted that uncertainty was their greatest asset. The longer the science could be presented as uncertain, the longer business as usual could continue.

The media, meanwhile, shaped public perception with a mixture of sensationalism and false equivalence. Complex scientific findings were compressed into headlines. The appearance of “both sides” in debates gave undue airtime to lobbyists and pseudoscientific voices. And genuine scientific uncertainty, part of the natural process of discovery, was portrayed as evidence of doubt, not refinement.

NGOs, once the conscience of environmental advocacy, increasingly blurred their identity through partnerships with industry. Conservation International, The Nature Conservancy, and the World Wildlife Fund have all faced criticism for accepting millions in corporate funding from companies with poor environmental records. These relationships have often muted their criticisms or shaped their priorities. Some NGOs began advocating for carbon markets and green investment tools, providing environmental legitimacy to questionable practices. Even international institutions such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) have participated in global offsetting initiatives that shift responsibility without reducing real harm.

Today, carbon markets are among the most egregious outcomes of this distortion. The logic behind them is seductive: put a price on carbon and let the market do the work. But in practice, these schemes have become vehicles for greenwashing, corruption, and displacement of responsibility. Companies continue polluting while purchasing cheap credits generated from tree planting schemes, many of which are unverifiable, impermanent, or even fraudulent. Some “offsets” protect forests that were never under threat. Others displace indigenous communities.

Case studies across Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia have shown that offset projects frequently fail to deliver the promised carbon sequestration. In Kenya and Uganda, forest carbon schemes have pushed local farmers off ancestral land, only for those areas to be sold to multinational corporations. In Brazil, “avoided deforestation” schemes have been used to greenwash soy and beef operations, despite continuous deforestation in adjacent zones. Many credits represent promises of future carbon absorption, estimates of what might be saved, not removals that have already occurred.

The international treaties that were meant to coordinate a global response have largely failed.

The Kyoto Failure

The Kyoto Protocol (1997) was undermined from its inception.

Firstly, the lack of comprehensive participation severely undermined the Protocol’s effectiveness. Notably, the United States, which was one of the largest carbon emitters at the time, decided not to ratify the agreement, resulting in significant gaps in the collective effort required to tackle climate change, leading to criticisms regarding the Protocol’s overall effectiveness (Büchner et al., 2005) (Büchner et al., 2002). The withdrawal of the US created a perception of diminished commitment among other parties, hindering a cohesive global response to climate change (Böhringer, 2002). Furthermore, many developing nations, while not bound by the same emission reduction commitments, have increased their emissions without a strong regulatory framework to incentivise reductions (Paltsev, 2001).

The design of the Kyoto Protocol also had inherent limitations. It included relatively generous emission caps for many industrialised nations, which some argue failed to reflect the urgency of the climate crisis. According to (Barrett, 2008), simply tightening these limits would not adequately address the Protocol’s inefficiencies, as issues related to participation and compliance remained unaddressed (Barrett, 2008). This sentiment is echoed in literature indicating that, despite some nations demonstrating a pre-emptive decrease in emissions prior to the Protocol’s ratification, the actual reductions fell short of what was promised (Wang et al., 2019) (Aichele, 2013).

Moreover, the Protocol’s mechanisms, such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), intended to facilitate emissions reduction in developing countries, have been criticised for promoting “carbon leakage,” where companies move operations to countries with less stringent environmental regulations to evade the costs associated with compliance (Hartl, 2019). This phenomenon exacerbated the global issue of climate change, as emissions were effectively shifted rather than curtailed.

The economic implications of the Kyoto Protocol also present significant critiques. Reports suggest that while there were localised reductions in emissions in some participating countries, the overall economic impacts highlighted a decline in industrial production, particularly in those that adhered strictly to the Protocol’s restrictions (Miller et al., 2023). This led to questions regarding the sustainability of economic growth under stringent environmental regulations (Almer & Winkler, 2017).

Thus, the Kyoto Protocol’s challenges arose from inadequate participation, poorly set emission targets, structural loopholes facilitating carbon leakage, and substantial economic drawbacks for adherent countries. The necessity for a more inclusive and effectively enforced agreement was evident, setting the stage for subsequent frameworks like the Paris Agreement, which sought to overcome these shortcomings by promoting broader participation and stricter accountability mechanisms (Kim et al., 2020).

The Paris Fiasco – Sorry, Agreement

The Paris Agreement, which was established during COP21 in 2015, was initially heralded as a landmark achievement in international climate negotiations, setting a global framework for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. However, critiques of its effectiveness have emerged, highlighting significant challenges that inhibit its success in addressing climate change.

One of the primary criticisms revolves around the Agreement’s reliance on Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), which, conveniently, lack legally binding enforcement mechanisms. This structure allowed countries to set their own targets without the obligation to meet them, potentially undermining the effectiveness of global climate commitments (Bakker, 2016).

The legal ambiguities within the agreement also lead to challenges in enforcement, limiting the capacity for legal recourse in cases of non-compliance (Bakker, 2016). Critics argue that this voluntary approach has resulted in insufficient progress towards the critical climate targets. As a result, the global mean surface temperatures have remained at or above 1.5 °C for extended periods, raising concerns about the long-term viability of the targets set by the Paris Agreement (Cannon, 2024) (Cannon, 2025).

Moreover, systemic structural limitations stemming from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), of which the Paris Agreement is a part, are also highlighted. The legacy of past negotiations, particularly the Kyoto Protocol, continues to influence current discussions, often pointing to flaws in mechanisms that do not effectively bind states to meaningful action (Antypas, 2024).

Some scientists and activists have labelled the agreement as “wishful thinking” or fundamentally flawed, suggesting that it provides “false hope” rather than actionable solutions (Bergkamp, 2016) (Beardsworth, 2025). This dissatisfaction reflects a broader concern that the agreement allows states to prioritise national economic interests over global climate needs, perpetuating a cycle of inadequate environmental action (Beardsworth, 2025).

Political dynamics also play a critical role in the effectiveness of the Paris Agreement. International cooperation can be heavily influenced by national policies that may shift with changes in government (Allan, 2019). For example, the United States’ fluctuating commitment to the agreement under different administrations highlights vulnerabilities within collaborative global frameworks (Antypas, 2024) (Nwankwo, 2019). The perception among some nations that they can disengage from commitments without facing significant repercussions further exacerbates global climate inaction (Heinke et al., 2019).

Thus, like Kyoto, the Paris Agreement has encountered substantial challenges that endanger its objectives. The absence of enforceable commitments, coupled with pre-existing structural flaws in international climate governance, has fostered a landscape where ambitious climate goals remain elusive. These shortcomings, along with shifting national policies and growing evidence of environmental thresholds being crossed, indicate significant failures in the implementation and impact of the Paris Agreement thus far.

One would not be overly cynical in concluding that politicians deliberately created Kyoto and Paris to fail, to make them unenforceable with no actual consequences to allow “business as usual” whilst placating the public and environmental campaign groups.

Climate Capitalism

The rise of climate capitalism, the flawed idea that markets alone can solve ecological collapse, has proven especially insidious. Venture capital flows into “green tech” startups, many of which do nothing to reduce overall consumption or pollution. Electric vehicles, solar panels, and battery storage systems are hailed as solutions, yet their production often relies on rare earth mining, toxic waste, and exploitative labour practices. We are replacing one form of extraction with another, merely shifting the burden geographically and rhetorically.

This is not a transition to sustainability. It is a repackaging of destruction.

Public trust has eroded, and rightly so. Citizens are bombarded with conflicting messages: told to recycle plastic that ends up incinerated, to buy “green” products made from slave labour, or to trust that carbon neutrality can be bought with an airline ticket. The more people are told they can solve systemic collapse through individual purchases, the more paralysed and disillusioned they become – and the richer some parts of society continue to be.

Many scientists who raised legitimate concerns, about the reliability of models, the role of water vapour, or the importance of natural carbon fluxes, have been silenced, marginalised, or excluded from conferences and had funding cancelled. Peer reviewed dissent was framed as denialism, and the nuanced voices calling for holistic systems thinking were drowned out by soundbites and slogans. Even when advocates were found to be manipulating data or just fabricating it, they maintained funding and their positions. Politicisation of climate science was and is rife, the shout of “follow the science” is quietly nuanced as “follow the science, if you agree with me, or your wrong, simple as that”. There was no room for tacit and frank discussion, you either shut up and went along, or you lost your tenure, job, reputation and life.

Education, too, became part of the propaganda machine. Climate change was reduced to linear temperature rise charts and polar bear images. The complexity of Earth systems, the deep interplay between tectonics, hydrology, biology, and chemistry, was glossed over in favour of emotionally loaded visuals and easily digested figures. An entire generation was taught to fear CO₂ while being given no real tools to understand ecosystems, resilience, or long-term environmental health.

This section has charted how we got here. From the early scientific warnings to the modern propaganda machine of carbon markets and green PR. It is a story of hubris, misdirection, and wilful simplification. It is not a story of ignorance. It is a story of exploitation.

In the sections that follow, we will return to the truth: that the environment is not a sector to be managed by offset spreadsheets, but the living system upon which our survival depends. It cannot be bribed, ignored, or replaced. Only understood, respected, and restored.

We will expose the myths, the lies and the truth, as far as we know it today in the middle of 2025. Our knowledge is expanding monthly, that must change our narrative and perspective.

 

Key References:

1. Supran, G., & Oreskes, N. (2017). Assessing ExxonMobil’s climate change communications (1977–2014). Environmental Research Letters, 12(8). https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aa815f
2. Franta, B. (2018). Shell and Exxon’s secret 1980s climate change warnings. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2018/sep/19/shell-and-exxons-secret-1980s-climate-change-warnings
3. Oreskes, N., & Conway, E. M. (2010). Merchants of Doubt. Bloomsbury Press.
4. Keeling, C. D. (1960). The concentration and isotopic abundances of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Tellus, 12(2).
5. Brundtland, G. H. (1987). Our Common Future. United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development.
6. (1990–2023). Assessment Reports. https://www.ipcc.ch/reports/
7. Supran, G., & Rahmstorf, S. (2023). How Big Oil distorted climate science – and why it still matters. Nature, 614(7949). https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-00107-2
8. West, T. A., et al. (2023). Integrity gaps in voluntary carbon markets. Science, 380(6649), 246-248. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adf3977
9. Carrington, D. (2023). Revealed: more than 90% of rainforest carbon offsets by biggest certifier are worthless. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/18/revealed-90-of-rainforest-carbon-offsets-are-worthless-verra-analysis
10. (2022). Carbon Offsetting: The Real Story. https://www.greenpeace.org.uk/resources/carbon-offsetting-real-story/
11. Bond, P. (2012). Politics of Climate Justice: Paralysis Above, Movement Below. University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
12. Lohmann, L. (2009). Climate as Investment. The Corner House. https://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/climate-investment
13. International Rivers. (2014). Trading in False Solutions: Carbon Offsets and Hydropower. https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/
14. Ansaripour, M., Haghshenasfard, M., & Moheb, A. (2017). Experimental and numerical investigation of co2 absorption using nanofluids in a hollow‐fiber membrane contactor.
15. Chemical Engineering & Technology, 41(2), 367-378. https://doi.org/10.1002/ceat.201700182
16. Beck, V. (2023). Climate hypocrisy and environmental integrity. Journal of Social Philosophy, 56(2), 223-242. https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12522
17. Heede, R. (2013). Tracing anthropogenic carbon dioxide and methane emissions to fossil fuel and cement producers, 1854–2010. Climatic Change, 122(1-2), 229-241. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0986-y
18. McCright, A. and Dunlap, R. (2011). The politicization of climate change and polarization in the American public’s views of global warming, 2001–2010. Sociological [19] Quarterly, 52(2), 155-194. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-8525.2011.01198.x
19. Withdraw, w. (2024). Withdraw. Theoretical and Natural Science, 40(1), 1-7. https://doi.org/10.54254/2753-8818/40/20240199
20. Franzen, H. and Franzen, S. (2024). A physical demonstration of the increase in global surface energy due to increasing pco2.. https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-3674188/v1
21. Hasselmann, K. (1999). Climate prediction is heavy weather. Physics World, 12(12), 24-24. https://doi.org/10.1088/2058-7058/12/12/7
22. Hindiyeh, M., Albatayneh, A., Tarawneh, R., Jaradat, M., Al-Omary, M., Abdelal, Q., … & Jeguirim, M. (2021). Sea level rise mitigation by global sea water desalination using renewable-energy-powered plants. Sustainability, 13(17), 9552. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13179552
23. Hori, H., Takano, Y., Koike, K., Takeuchi, K., & Einaga, H. (2002). Decomposition of environmentally persistent trifluoroacetic acid to fluoride ions by a homogeneous photocatalyst in water. Environmental Science & Technology, 37(2), 418-422. https://doi.org/10.1021/es025783y
24. Lapenis, A. (1998). Arrhenius and the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Eos, 79(23), 271-271. https://doi.org/10.1029/98eo00206
25. MacCracken, M. (2006). Climate change discussions in Washington: a matter of contending perspectives. Environmental Values, 15(3), 381-395. https://doi.org/10.1177/096327190601500312
26. Mitchell, G. (2022). Circular seas – the next challenge for plastics. Polymer Science Peer Review Journal, 3(1). https://doi.org/10.31031/psprj.2022.03.000551
27. Upadhyay, V. and Sachdeva, K. (2012). Climate change: our rush to extinction or victim of our own success?. Environmental Management and Sustainable Development, 1(1). https://doi.org/10.5296/emsd.v1i1.1554
28. Bao, J. and He, M. (2022). Does green credit promote green sustainable development in regional economies?—empirical evidence from 280 cities in China. Plos One, 17(11), e0277569. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0277569
29. Chang, A. (2015). The politics and future of carbon cap-and-trade: lessons from the European union. Claremont-Uc Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union, 2014(1), 75-90. https://doi.org/10.5642/urceu.201401.07
30. Fankhauser, S. and Hepburn, C. (2010). Designing carbon markets, part ii: carbon markets in space. Energy Policy, 38(8), 4381-4387. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.03.066
31. Gai, G. and Wang, Y. (2024). Research on China’s environmental law and low-carbon emission economy trade surplus under the background of carbon neutrality. Ieti Transactions on Data Analysis and Forecasting (Itdaf), 2(1), 23-32. https://doi.org/10.3991/itdaf.v2i1.49197
32. Li, Y., Ding, T., & Zhu, W. (2022). Can green credit contribute to sustainable economic growth? an empirical study from China. Sustainability, 14(11), 6661. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14116661
33. Liu, Q. (2023). Examining the effects and operational mechanisms of green credit on carbon emissions in Chinese regions. Proceedings of Business and Economic Studies, 6(5), 38-48. https://doi.org/10.26689/pbes.v6i5.5434
34. Liu, X. and Guo, W. (2024). Can the green credit policy achieve synergizing the reduction of pollution and carbon emissions? evidence from China.. https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-3829354/v1
35. Liu, X., Chen, Z., Yu, Q., Fang, L., Gong, J., & Wen, C. (2023). Carbon trading systems and credit spreads of highly polluting corporate bonds: an empirical study based on a triple difference model.. https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-2563261/v1
36. Lo, A. (2023). Carbon offsetting and renewable energy development. Geographical Research, 61(2), 158-163. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-5871.12600
37. Qin, J. and Cao, J. (2022). Carbon emission reduction effects of green credit policies: empirical evidence from China. Frontiers in Environmental Science, 10. https://doi.org/10.3389/fenvs.2022.798072
38. Zhang, W., Ming-Yong, H., Li, J., & Fu-Hong, L. (2021). An examination of green credit promoting carbon dioxide emissions reduction: a provincial panel analysis of China. Sustainability, 13(13), 7148. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13137148
39. Zheng, Z. and Men, C. (2025). Greener together or carbon leakage? what regional effect can green credit policy bring. Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, 12(2). https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.70019
40. Aichele, R. (2013). The effect of the Kyoto protocol on carbon emissions. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 32(4), 731-757. https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.21720
41. Almer, C. and Winkler, R. (2017). Analysing the effectiveness of international environmental policies: the case of the Kyoto protocol. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 82, 125-151. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2016.11.003
42. Barrett, S. (2008). Climate treaties and the imperative of enforcement. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 24(2), 239-258. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grn015
43. Böhringer, C. (2002). Climate politics from Kyoto to Bonn: from little to nothing?. The Energy Journal, 23(2), 51-71. https://doi.org/10.5547/issn0195-6574-ej-vol23-no2-2
44. Büchner, B., Carraro, C., & Cersosimo, I. (2002). Economic consequences of the us withdrawal from the Kyoto/Bonn protocol. Climate Policy, 2(4), 273-292. https://doi.org/10.3763/cpol.2002.0234
45. Büchner, B., Carraro, C., Cersosimo, I., & Marchiori, C. (2005). Back to Kyoto? us participation and the linkage between r&d and climate cooperation., 173-204. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3425-3_7
46. Hartl, A. (2019). The effects of the Kyoto protocol on the carbon trade balance. Review of World Economics, 155(3), 539-574. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-019-00350-5
47. Kim, Y., Tanaka, K., & Matsuoka, S. (2020). Environmental and economic effectiveness of the Kyoto protocol. Plos One, 15(7), e0236299. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236299
48. Miller, A., Atakhanov, A., Guliyev, M., Azizov, T., & Huseynova, K. (2023). The economic effect of the measures provided for by the Kyoto protocol by region (as of the 2020s). Scientific Horizons, 26(4). https://doi.org/10.48077/scihor4.2023.136
49. Paltsev, S. (2001). The Kyoto protocol: regional and sectoral contributions to the carbon leakage. The Energy Journal, 22(4), 53-79. https://doi.org/10.5547/issn0195-6574-ej-vol22-no4-3
50. Wang, C., Ko, M., & Chen, W. (2019). Effects of Kyoto protocol on co2 emissions: a five-country rolling regression analysis. Sustainability, 11(3), 744. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11030744
51. Allan, J. (2019). Dangerous incrementalism of the Paris agreement. Global Environmental Politics, 19(1), 4-11. https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00488
52. Antypas, A. (2024). Saving the United Nations framework convention on climate change from itself: complementary and alternative approaches. Turkey Urbanism and the New Habitat, 82(3), 3-8. https://doi.org/10.53910/26531313-e2022823668
53. Bakker, C. (2016). The Paris agreement on climate change: balancing “legal force” and “geographical scope”. The Italian Yearbook of International Law Online, 25(1), 299-309. https://doi.org/10.1163/22116133-90000117a
54. Beardsworth, R. (2025). The tenth anniversary of the Paris agreement: cop30, failure, and renewal. Open Access Government, 46(1), 386-387. https://doi.org/10.56367/oag-046-11900
55. Bergkamp, L. (2016). The Paris agreement on climate change: a risk regulation perspective. European Journal of Risk Regulation, 7(1), 35-41. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1867299x00005353
56. Cannon, A. (2024). Twelve months at 1.5 °c signals earlier than expected breach of Paris agreement threshold.. https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-4993478/v3
57. Cannon, A. (2025). Twelve months at 1.5 °c signals earlier than expected breach of Paris agreement threshold. Nature Climate Change, 15(3), 266-269. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-025-02247-8
58. Heinke, J., Müller, C., Lannerstad, M., Gerten, D., & Lucht, W. (2019). Freshwater resources under success and failure of the Paris climate agreement. Earth System Dynamics, 10(2), 205-217. https://doi.org/10.5194/esd-10-205-2019
59. Nwankwo, C. (2019). Understanding us government reluctance to accept legally binding emissions reduction targets: the import of elite interest convergence. Open Political Science, 2(1), 9-20. https://doi.org/10.1515/openps-2019-0002